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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument - Stanford Encyclopedia of … 3 Sep 2002 · 5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument. There has not been much discussion of the knowledge argument from a dualist perspective. This is unsurprising given the small number of contemporary philosophers who defend a dualist position (for a prominent exception see Chalmers (1996); the knowledge argument is discussed on pp. 140–146).
Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 18 Jun 2004 · Substance dualism, such as traditional Cartesian dualism (Descartes 1644), asserts the existence of both physical and non-physical substances. Such theories entail the existence of non-physical minds or selves as entities in which consciousness inheres.
Descartes’ Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 Dec 1997 · The second proposition is a premise in a Third Meditation argument for God – a proposition immune to doubt, according to bounded doubt interpretations. What is supposed to be the relevant difference between these propositions?
Physicalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 13 Feb 2001 · A good example is necessitation dualism, which is an approach that weaves together elements of both physicalism and its traditional rival, dualism. On the one hand, the necessitation dualist wants to say that mental facts and physical facts are metaphysically distinct—just as a standard dualist does.
Mental Causation - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 18 Dec 2003 · At the same time, Davidson’s view entails type dualism, for the anomalism of the mental (the third principle) precludes identities between mental and physical types. Most philosophers find it natural to say that types are properties, so Davidson is sometimes described as a property dualist, a convenient label for the time being (but see §5.5).
Dualism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 19 Aug 2003 · There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate ...
Some issues in Locke’s Philosophy of Mind - Stanford … These claims and suggestions, along with a number of others, turn out to be connected in interesting ways and raise important questions about the degree to which Locke is willing to endorse substance dualism and the extent of his commitment to Boylean mechanism.
Dualism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 19 Aug 2003 · There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lited upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate ...
René Descartes - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 Dec 2008 · This conclusion asserts the well-known substance dualism of Descartes. That dualism has problems. As Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, among others, asked: if mind is unextended and matter is extended, how do they interact?
Monism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 19 Mar 2007 · Among pluralists it is sometimes useful to single out the dualist: the dualist for \(t\) and \(u\) holds that \(t\) counted by \(u\) is two. To illustrate these various doctrines for various targets and units, let the target \(t_1 =\) concrete objects, and let the unit \(u_1 =\) highest type.