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Robert Putnam Two Level Games

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Understanding Robert Putnam's Two-Level Games: Navigating International Negotiations



International relations are rarely simple. Agreements between nations often involve complex negotiations where domestic and international pressures collide. Robert Putnam's "two-level game" theory provides a valuable framework for understanding this complex interplay. This theory, presented in his 1988 article, helps explain why international agreements are sometimes reached and sometimes fail, highlighting the critical role of domestic politics in shaping international outcomes.


Level 1: The International Game



This level represents the traditional view of international negotiations – the interactions between states or their representatives. At this level, negotiators bargain over specific issues, seeking a mutually acceptable agreement. This might involve trade deals, arms control treaties, or environmental accords. The focus is on strategic interactions between nations, considering their relative power, interests, and the potential gains or losses from an agreement.

Example: Imagine two countries negotiating a free trade agreement. At Level 1, negotiators from both countries discuss tariff reductions, market access, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Their primary goal is to secure an agreement that benefits their respective countries economically.


Level 2: The Domestic Game



This is where Putnam's theory adds significant depth. Level 2 focuses on the domestic political pressures facing negotiators. Each negotiator isn't just representing their country on the international stage; they're also navigating domestic political landscapes. They must gain approval for any agreement from various domestic actors, including interest groups, political parties, and the public. These actors often have conflicting interests and preferences, creating challenges for negotiators.

Example: In the free trade agreement example, the negotiators must consider how the deal will affect specific industries within their own countries. Farmers might oppose the agreement if it leads to increased competition, while manufacturers might favor it due to cheaper imported raw materials. The negotiators need to navigate these competing interests to secure domestic support for the agreement.


The Interplay Between Levels: Win-Sets and Ratification



The success of an international agreement hinges on the interplay between these two levels. Putnam introduces the concept of a "win-set," which represents the set of all possible agreements that would be acceptable to a nation's domestic actors. A larger win-set implies greater flexibility for negotiators at Level 1, as they have more room to maneuver and compromise. A small or non-existent win-set makes agreement difficult, even if a seemingly beneficial deal exists at Level 1. Ratification of the agreement at Level 2 is crucial; without it, the international agreement collapses.

Example: If a country's domestic actors have strong protectionist tendencies, its win-set for a free trade agreement will be small, perhaps even nonexistent. This severely limits the negotiator's ability to compromise at Level 1, potentially leading to the failure of negotiations. Conversely, a country with a broad consensus on the benefits of free trade will have a larger win-set, providing greater negotiating flexibility.


Strategies and Outcomes



Negotiators employ various strategies to navigate the two-level game. They might try to shape public opinion to enlarge their win-set, or they might make concessions at Level 1 to secure domestic support at Level 2. The outcome depends on the interaction between these strategies and the size of the win-sets in each country. A successful outcome requires finding a point of overlap between the win-sets of all participating nations.

Example: A negotiator might publicly emphasize the job creation potential of a trade deal to garner domestic support, thus expanding their win-set. They could also strategically concede on certain aspects of the deal at Level 1 to make it more palatable to domestic stakeholders.


Key Takeaways and Actionable Insights



Putnam's two-level game theory highlights the importance of understanding both international and domestic factors in international negotiations. Successful outcomes require careful consideration of domestic political constraints and the strategic manipulation of win-sets. Ignoring domestic politics can lead to failed negotiations, even when a seemingly beneficial international agreement is available.


FAQs



1. Is the two-level game always relevant? While highly relevant in many cases, the applicability depends on the issue's domestic political salience. Some agreements have minimal domestic impact, minimizing the influence of Level 2.

2. Can a negotiator control their win-set? While negotiators cannot fully control their win-set, they can influence it through strategic communication, coalition-building, and compromises.

3. How does the theory account for non-state actors? The theory can be extended to include non-state actors like NGOs and multinational corporations, whose influence can affect both levels of the game.

4. What are the limitations of the two-level game theory? It simplifies a complex process; it doesn't fully account for the nuances of domestic politics or the unforeseen events that can affect negotiations.

5. How can this theory be used in practice? Policymakers and negotiators can use this framework to anticipate domestic resistance, build coalitions, and develop strategies to maximize their chances of success in international negotiations.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions. Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages.

the logic of two-level games Robert D. Putnam - JSTOR the logic of two-level games Robert D. Putnam Introduction: the entanglements of domestic and international politics Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations,

Putnam’s two-level games - Bridging the gap: the two-level game ... 43 of analysis in the study of international relations (Putnam, 1988).23 This analytical framework focuses on the figure of “chief negotiators”, who participate in two negotiations that may be conceived as taking place either sequentially or simultaneously: a “level I game” in which they bargain with their foreign peers in order to coordinate policies in a specific issue-area and a ...

Two-level game theory - Wikipedia Two-level game theory is a political model, derived from game theory, that illustrates the domestic-international interactions between states. It was originally introduced in 1988 by Robert D. Putnam in his publication "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games".

Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games 43. Several investigators in other fields have recently proposed models of linked games akin to this “two-level” game. Kenneth A. Shepsle and his colleagues have used the notion of “interconnected games” to analyze, for example, the strategy of a legislator simultaneously embedded in two games, one in the legislative arena and the other in the electoral arena.

The Logic of Two-Level Games - Olivia Lau Putnam: The Logic of Two Level Games Putnam discusses whether domestic politics influence international politics or vice-versa and his answer is both. He advocates “general equilibrium” theories which account simultaneously for the interaction of ... The Logic of Two-Level Games Author: Robert Putnam (notes by Chatterjee) Created Date: 5/23 ...

Two-LeveL Games and The PoLicy Process - JSTOR nant (Lentner 2006; Putnam 1988).2 in the late 1980s, however, a breakthrough was made when robert Putnam presented the Two-Level Game as an enhanced method of foreign policy analysis. Building on rosenau’s work, Putnam (1988) argued for the necessity of focusing on the interplay between domestic

Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games 3 Feb 2018 · Level Games; Robert D. Putnam International . Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3. ... This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency ...

Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games … Summary Introduction: the Entanglements of Domestic and International Politics Robert D. Putnam contends that the influence of domestic politics on international relations has not yet been detailed satisfactorily. Putnam utilizes the example of the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978 which was a meeting of seven nations known as the "G7." The purpose of the conference was to …

Explanatory Power of the Two­ level Game Approach The article uses Putnam's concept of two-level games as a basic model of international-domestic relations, hoping to expand on the concept whilst retaining its integrity. ... INTRODUCTION About two decades ago Robert Putnam offered the model of two­level game that stressed interac­ tion of international relations and domestic politics.1 The ...